http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/09/26/do-96-percent-of-americans-receive-government-benefits/
This issue of how to talk about what constitutes a government benefit really interests me. On the one hand, you have direct benefits, generally for those who wouldn't have a tax liability and are net takers rather than payers. Then you have those who get tax expenditures, and may still be net payers, but with a lower tax liability than they would have if they didn't get a special deduction. (I agree that this constitutes "spending" as much as a direct program, because to the extent that the $ is fungible, paying less in vs. paying more in but getting a direct payment out has essentially the same effect. But, the net taker/payer issues still stands even with this reading.) Then you have the roads and farm subsidies and so forth that everyone benefits from with varying degrees of directness.
The discourse (such as it is) right now centers on who receives benefits, when what people are actually fighting about to me seems closer to people who are net takers vs. net payers. Attacking Republicans for hypocrisy over who receives benefits is a bit of a straw man in this way, because I think what most of them are really talking about is the latter issue. That's not to say there isn't hypocrisy in that position; just that it requires a different tack than simply pointing out that 96% of Americans receive benefits.
To me, the heart of this issue is the age-old puritanical story of who a "deserving" recipient of government spending is. Is it the person who still pays in, but for just social policy reasons, receives some of that money back? Can it be the person who doesn't pay in because they make too little money, and is a net receiver of government spending? I believe that person can still be deserving of government spending. The EITC is a good example of a program that tries to suss out further what qualities make someone deserving--in this case, it's someone who works, but whose wages are too low to subsist at a standard we as Americans believe our society should support.
This touches on broader economic theory, of how good a job the market does of rewarding productivity through wages--i.e., the justification for why an NFL quarterback makes 100 times the base salary of a Chicago public school teacher. A position against the "deservingness" of an individual who works but makes too little to subsist and is therefore a net taker might be based on economic efficiency or the invisible hand or what have you, but I think most people would agree that the market is not doing an adequate job allocating resources when someone performing a job somebody has to do can't actually survive humanely on the wages. This to me makes the case for government spending on that person, to correct a market failure. My understanding of the intersection between classical economics and fiscal policy is tragically primitive considering my education, but this is a topic I would love to spend some time chatting about with a real economist.
Wednesday, September 26, 2012
Monday, September 24, 2012
Education Reform--Too Good to be True?
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/10/the-writing-revolution/309090/1/
This makes a lot of sense to me, because it is consistent with how I personally learn things--learn the formula, then repeat, expand, improve, innovate. (See what I did there? Using New Dorp's formula helped me express a thought, even now.) I also write to organize my thoughts, and that process advances my learning.
Could it be that we have swung too far away from the Catholic instruction of the 50s, and simply need to find the right balance between the formulaic and the creative? This article presents the Hochman approach practically as a panacea to our failing education system, not invoking criticisms until the back half of the last page. What about the method isn't convincing? What evidence exists to shed light on how scalable a solution this might be?
This makes a lot of sense to me, because it is consistent with how I personally learn things--learn the formula, then repeat, expand, improve, innovate. (See what I did there? Using New Dorp's formula helped me express a thought, even now.) I also write to organize my thoughts, and that process advances my learning.
Could it be that we have swung too far away from the Catholic instruction of the 50s, and simply need to find the right balance between the formulaic and the creative? This article presents the Hochman approach practically as a panacea to our failing education system, not invoking criticisms until the back half of the last page. What about the method isn't convincing? What evidence exists to shed light on how scalable a solution this might be?
Wednesday, September 19, 2012
Description/Prescription
http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/18/douthat-our-revolting-elites/?hp
In this op-ed, Ross Douthat riffs on the phenomenon that's happening on both sides of the aisle--the disconnection of the political elites from those that they govern--an interesting topic that has come up repeatedly for me recently, and which I'll try to keep in mind for further delving into.
Most recently, obviously, it was Mitt Romney who committed the error of writing off the 47 percent. In 2008, it was Barack Obama who derided the working class as folks who bitterly cling to guns and religion in the context of an economy that has failed them.
Douthat has questions to pose to both sides, but the one I'll remark on is the one he poses to Democrats:
"What does it say that rich Democrats can’t fathom why working class Americans might look askance at an elite that’s presided over a long slow social breakdown and often regards their fundamental religious convictions as obstacles to progress?"
The first part of Douthat's assertion resonates with me--there's certainly an argument to be made that the unintended consequences of social programs that have been the flagship of Democratic policies have contributed to social breakdown including dependency on benefits and unstable households.
His second assertion I find harder to internalize, because while he's certainly right in regards to the perception Democrats allow to persist about their feelings towards Christian fundamentalists (and this perception perpetuates real harm), I don't think this perception aligns with a true interpretation of a Democratic theory of justice.
An example: Democrats are quick to decry the religious intolerance they see in conservative defenses of free speech with respect to the Terry Jones video, yet tacitly condone religious intolerance towards Christian fundamentalists. The operative phrase here is "tacitly condone," because I don't think hypocrisy in this respect is at the core of Democratic philosophy; rather, Democrats often fail to clarify a complex issue, and by doing so, perpetuate a stance of intolerance towards social conservatives.
What complexity is actually at the core of Democratic principles of fairness and justice? The case of the protests at the American embassy in Egypt continues to be illustrative. The embassy attempted to affirm religious tolerance while rejecting violence purportedly justified by that religion. Is rejecting violence predicated on religion inherently intolerant? By extrapolation, is it intolerant of the American Left to decry bigoted behavior against gay people (to take one example) because said bigotry is a byproduct of religous beliefs?
I believe it is partly a question of competing principles, and partly a question of sophistry. On the semantic side, one could go down a rabbit hole of "tolerance of intolerance." But in trying to stick to something real and useful, sometimes we are forced to make hard choices between ideals that we as Americans hold very dear. It isn't totally off the wall to say that where one side or the other draws the line is arbitrary, but I think "first do no harm" is a good place to start. Choosing between limiting harm to others on the one hand and allowing the greatest degree of religious freedom on the other is always going to be a balancing act, but limiting harm will usually be pretty hard to trump for me. For some people it may be the other way around--some will have a higher tolerance for a little harm, or see religious intolerance as a harm in and of itself--but I don't think the Left's attitude towards Christian fundamentalism is as inconsistent as Democrats often let it appear to be.
From where I stand, certain fundamental religious convictions of the Christian right are obstacles to progress. I can't pretend that I am at once 100% tolerant, and still support what I believe are the fundamental human rights of women, gay people, etc. However, I like to think I stop short of the condescension that most Christian fundamentalists are themselves obstacles to progress, or have nothing progressive to offer our society (or even less to offer than myself. I have a lot to learn from plenty of them). I hope I can stand up for my disagreement with certain principles without standing up for ad hominem, flippant attacks against groups of people, just as I try to live with the cognitive dissonance that we can at once promote religious tolerance even while denouncing the violence (in some interpretations) demanded by that religion.
So, I can understand why working class Americans might look askance at liberal elites, but I partially reject that this looking askance is justified against Democrats on the basis of religious intolerance. I don't think the Democrats do enough to distance themselves from an ignorant, condescending attitude towards conservative Christians, but I don't think it's fair to say that the Democratic party is wrongly intolerant of a group of people on a religious basis. I think they are rightly intolerant of beliefs, rooted in religion, that cause harm to other groups of people, and are wrongly silent when they allow the prioritization of primum non nocere over complete religious carte blanche to be conflated with disdain for an entire group of Americans. When we are silent, we don't just make ourselves look bad--we implicitly condone the simplistic and unjust view that Christian fundamentalists are obstacles to progress, and this causes real harm.
In this op-ed, Ross Douthat riffs on the phenomenon that's happening on both sides of the aisle--the disconnection of the political elites from those that they govern--an interesting topic that has come up repeatedly for me recently, and which I'll try to keep in mind for further delving into.
Most recently, obviously, it was Mitt Romney who committed the error of writing off the 47 percent. In 2008, it was Barack Obama who derided the working class as folks who bitterly cling to guns and religion in the context of an economy that has failed them.
Douthat has questions to pose to both sides, but the one I'll remark on is the one he poses to Democrats:
"What does it say that rich Democrats can’t fathom why working class Americans might look askance at an elite that’s presided over a long slow social breakdown and often regards their fundamental religious convictions as obstacles to progress?"
The first part of Douthat's assertion resonates with me--there's certainly an argument to be made that the unintended consequences of social programs that have been the flagship of Democratic policies have contributed to social breakdown including dependency on benefits and unstable households.
His second assertion I find harder to internalize, because while he's certainly right in regards to the perception Democrats allow to persist about their feelings towards Christian fundamentalists (and this perception perpetuates real harm), I don't think this perception aligns with a true interpretation of a Democratic theory of justice.
An example: Democrats are quick to decry the religious intolerance they see in conservative defenses of free speech with respect to the Terry Jones video, yet tacitly condone religious intolerance towards Christian fundamentalists. The operative phrase here is "tacitly condone," because I don't think hypocrisy in this respect is at the core of Democratic philosophy; rather, Democrats often fail to clarify a complex issue, and by doing so, perpetuate a stance of intolerance towards social conservatives.
What complexity is actually at the core of Democratic principles of fairness and justice? The case of the protests at the American embassy in Egypt continues to be illustrative. The embassy attempted to affirm religious tolerance while rejecting violence purportedly justified by that religion. Is rejecting violence predicated on religion inherently intolerant? By extrapolation, is it intolerant of the American Left to decry bigoted behavior against gay people (to take one example) because said bigotry is a byproduct of religous beliefs?
I believe it is partly a question of competing principles, and partly a question of sophistry. On the semantic side, one could go down a rabbit hole of "tolerance of intolerance." But in trying to stick to something real and useful, sometimes we are forced to make hard choices between ideals that we as Americans hold very dear. It isn't totally off the wall to say that where one side or the other draws the line is arbitrary, but I think "first do no harm" is a good place to start. Choosing between limiting harm to others on the one hand and allowing the greatest degree of religious freedom on the other is always going to be a balancing act, but limiting harm will usually be pretty hard to trump for me. For some people it may be the other way around--some will have a higher tolerance for a little harm, or see religious intolerance as a harm in and of itself--but I don't think the Left's attitude towards Christian fundamentalism is as inconsistent as Democrats often let it appear to be.
From where I stand, certain fundamental religious convictions of the Christian right are obstacles to progress. I can't pretend that I am at once 100% tolerant, and still support what I believe are the fundamental human rights of women, gay people, etc. However, I like to think I stop short of the condescension that most Christian fundamentalists are themselves obstacles to progress, or have nothing progressive to offer our society (or even less to offer than myself. I have a lot to learn from plenty of them). I hope I can stand up for my disagreement with certain principles without standing up for ad hominem, flippant attacks against groups of people, just as I try to live with the cognitive dissonance that we can at once promote religious tolerance even while denouncing the violence (in some interpretations) demanded by that religion.
So, I can understand why working class Americans might look askance at liberal elites, but I partially reject that this looking askance is justified against Democrats on the basis of religious intolerance. I don't think the Democrats do enough to distance themselves from an ignorant, condescending attitude towards conservative Christians, but I don't think it's fair to say that the Democratic party is wrongly intolerant of a group of people on a religious basis. I think they are rightly intolerant of beliefs, rooted in religion, that cause harm to other groups of people, and are wrongly silent when they allow the prioritization of primum non nocere over complete religious carte blanche to be conflated with disdain for an entire group of Americans. When we are silent, we don't just make ourselves look bad--we implicitly condone the simplistic and unjust view that Christian fundamentalists are obstacles to progress, and this causes real harm.
Friday, September 14, 2012
Speaking of the Chicago Teachers' Strike...
Of Confidence Fairies, Bond Vigilantes, and the Phantom Menace
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/sep/27/what-krugman-stiglitz-can-tell-us/?page=1
I've been wanting to better understand what is meant by "rent-seeking behavior" for a while.
I've been wanting to better understand what is meant by "rent-seeking behavior" for a while.
Economy I and Economy II
Brooks begins this article positing that there are two types of economies that exist side by side: the first being the economy that produces goods and faces fierce competition that forces it to innovate constantly; the second being the economy (like the public sector) that does not face much competition and becomes bloated and inefficient over time.
Brooks begins the first part of an argument, that Economy II must become more efficient because Economy I can no longer support it. I was interested to hear him discuss this in more detail, particularly the question of how we can cut the bloat from Economy II without actually damaging Economy I by killing demand, but instead it turned into an article about the Chicogo teacher's strike.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/14/opinion/brooks-apres-rahm-le-deluge.html?hp
Brooks begins the first part of an argument, that Economy II must become more efficient because Economy I can no longer support it. I was interested to hear him discuss this in more detail, particularly the question of how we can cut the bloat from Economy II without actually damaging Economy I by killing demand, but instead it turned into an article about the Chicogo teacher's strike.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/14/opinion/brooks-apres-rahm-le-deluge.html?hp
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